

## Historical Papers Communications historiques



# The Politics of Conscience: Winnipeg After the Strike

J. E. Rea

Volume 6, numéro 1, 1971

St. John 1971

URI : <https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/030469ar>

DOI : <https://doi.org/10.7202/030469ar>

[Aller au sommaire du numéro](#)

### Éditeur(s)

The Canadian Historical Association/La Société historique du Canada

### ISSN

0068-8878 (imprimé)

1712-9109 (numérique)

[Découvrir la revue](#)

### Citer cet article

Rea, J. E. (1971). The Politics of Conscience: Winnipeg After the Strike. *Historical Papers / Communications historiques*, 6(1), 276–288.  
<https://doi.org/10.7202/030469ar>

All rights reserved © The Canadian Historical Association/La Société historique du Canada, 1971

Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne.

<https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/>

**érudit**

Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit.

Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche.

<https://www.erudit.org/fr/>

## THE POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE: WINNIPEG AFTER THE STRIKE

J. E. REA

*University of Manitoba*

In the spring of 1969 the Winnipeg local of the United Steelworkers of America presented a plaque to the City Council commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Winnipeg General Strike. An acrimonious debate resulted over the propriety of accepting the gift. The furore came as no surprise to those familiar with the traditions of the city. The Strike was the pivotal event of its history, and has conditioned political life ever since. On the other hand, the incident of the plaque may have appeared somewhat bizarre to those who believed the General Strike concerned collective bargaining, an issue long since settled, even in Winnipeg.

Another discussion of the Strike and its implications would probably be quite redundant if one accepted fully the conclusion of D. C. Masters, that there was no attempted revolution in Winnipeg in the late spring of 1919, "that the strike was what it purported to be, an effort to secure the principle of collective bargaining".<sup>1</sup> At the risk of setting up a semantic straw man, it would seem that the term 'revolution' has caused considerable difficulty. Masters is undoubtedly right if one seeks to find in the activities of R. B. Russell and his fellow Strike leaders a seditious conspiracy leading to the violent overthrow of the established order. But is this the only acceptable interpretation of the word? More important, what were the long term objectives of Russell and his colleagues and how were these perceived by the Citizens' Committee of One Thousand which opposed the Strike? This involves the more general question of how seriously we are to take the rhetoric of the Strike leaders. It might seem reasonable to suggest that we place as much or as little credence in the exaggerated utterances of one side as the other. Bob Russell's claim that a soviet was to be set up in Winnipeg, or Labour's suggestion that the Manitoba Legislative Buildings would make a grand labour temple could then be equated with the Citizens' Committee charge that the ranks of the strikers were full of bomb-throwing bolsheviks.

It would, however, be unfortunate and misleading to wish a plague on both their houses and dismiss the inflammatory rhetoric of both. We are all aware that the hysteria of the Red Scare, in which Winnipeg was

obviously caught up, soon passed. But the psychology of the Strike took root in Winnipeg and became the delineating force in civic politics from that day to this. Labour and the Citizens' Committee<sup>2</sup> have been ranged against each other in the recurring battle for control of the city council. The posture of each was set in the emotions of the Strike. They have regarded each other, at times of heightened activity such as the immediate post-Strike elections or during the depression, as not only wrong but wicked. Karl Marx, in other words, came to Winnipeg in 1919 and in various disguises has lived there ever since.

The real meaning of the Strike as seen in subsequent Winnipeg elections can be stated in the following manner. What was attempted by labour in 1919 was a massive and permanent shift in economic power through the technique of the general strike. Political power would follow willy-nilly. This was the fear of the Citizens' Committee and the hope of Labour radicals. This assertion is open to challenge and qualification, but the political exertion which followed the Strike seems to give it validity. The proposition could also be re-stated in another way. The success or failure of the General Strike would determine the fate of the O.B.U. — the One Big Union movement. To understand the course of Winnipeg politics, the question of rhetoric again becomes important.

Russell and R. J. Jones were the two most prominent labour radicals in Winnipeg. They were also among the leading spirits of the Calgary Convention in March of 1919 which established the O.B.U. This convention fully accepted "the principle of Proletarian Dictatorship as being absolute and efficient for the transformation of capitalist private property to communal wealth".<sup>3</sup> Whether or not this was a faithful reflection of the design of those who organized the O.B.U. in Western Canada is beside the point. If the O.B.U. had a philosophical base, it was rooted in the concept of industrial unionism which, in 1919, meant the creation of an industrial republic within the political state.<sup>4</sup> To those outside the labour movement the O.B.U. was, then, at the very least, potentially revolutionary. As David Bercuson has shown in his recent, fine article, this was clearly the reaction of Arthur Meighen and the Minister of Labour, Senator Gideon Robertson.<sup>5</sup>

The over-reaction of the Citizens' Committee in Winnipeg becomes more understandable in this context. They were faced with a general strike, the major tactical weapon of the O.B.U. charting its course to utopia. The Citizens' Committee saw itself not only as the saviour

of the city but the defence of the nation against the domination of the O.B.U. It was ironic, in a way, since Russell and the other strike leaders were a pretty unlikely lot of revolutionaries. They had no coherent plan to conduct a general strike; and in fact stumbled erratically through day to day decisions. But the legacy of the General Strike for Winnipeg depended not so much on the reality of the situation, but rather on the image each side retained of the other's methods and motives. The riot and shooting, the use of troops, the arrest of the strike leaders, the refusal to reinstate strikers, the economic and political paralysis of the city, the conviction of many Winnipeggers that chaos had only narrowly been avoided, left in their wake mistrust, fear and bitterness. The Strike was ended, but Winnipeg was a hostile, political environment.

## II

The trauma of the Strike did not dissipate in the summer of 1919. Fear of the O.B.U. which still gripped the Citizens' Committee and Labour's deep sense of injury made it almost inevitable that the struggle would be transferred to the arena of civic politics. In early July a poll taken by the Trades and Labour Council endorsed the O.B.U. by a vote of 8,841 to 705.<sup>6</sup> The response of the Citizens' Committee was to reorganize itself into a political force. On August 20, 1919, a crowd of three thousand people jammed into the Board of Trade building to give enthusiastic ratification to the Citizens' League which would "permanently carry on the work of the Citizens' Committee of One Thousand".<sup>7</sup> At a subsequent meeting of the League in September an executive of six officers and fifty members-at-large was approved by the League.<sup>8</sup> A close examination of this executive clearly indicates the class bias of the League. It was comprised almost exclusively of business and professional men who lived in the high and middle-income residential areas of the city.<sup>9</sup> The *raison d'être* of the League was graphically stated by the guest speaker at the meeting, R. A. C. Manning, a lawyer and long-time Conservative Party organizer. The duty of the Citizens' League was to end the career of those men who had brought the O.B.U. to Winnipeg, precipitated the Strike and now were trying to take over civic politics.<sup>10</sup>

The League began to gear up for the Municipal election of November 28. Ward committees were established for each of Winnipeg's seven wards, a women's auxiliary was formed and a mass rally planned. The incumbent Mayor, C. F. Grey, was endorsed by the League.<sup>11</sup>

The electoral strategy was simple. The campaign would be the second round of the Strike. The economic power of labour was shattered; its political potential must also be broken.

Labour was also organizing. A nominating convention was sponsored by the Dominion Labour Party in October, a platform was drawn up and approved and scrutineers appointed. A central campaign committee, with representation from each ward, was installed at the Labour Temple. A Finance Committee and Literature Committee were organized, as well as a Women's Labour League.<sup>12</sup> The political polarization of the city was nicely symbolized by the opposing headquarters at the Board of Trade and the Labour Temple.

At stake in the Winnipeg election of 1919 were the mayoralty and one aldermanic seat in each of the city's seven wards. One-half of the fourteen member Council retired each year. Of the seven continuing aldermen, four were Labour supporters. Thus to ensure a one-vote majority, the League, in 1919, would have to win five seats, or four and the mayoralty. It had some statutory advantages. The property qualification eliminated many working men, especially among the recent immigrant groups. More important, plural voting existed in Winnipeg. Property owners could vote only in their home wards for mayor; but they could vote for aldermanic candidates in as many wards as they owned property. There was no residence requirement, which meant that any twenty-one year old who owned property worth one hundred dollars within the city could vote. Since these non-resident property owners would probably be predisposed against Labour, the Citizens' League sought them out assiduously. S. J. Farmer, the Labour candidate for mayor, charged later that "people travelled from Chicago, Vancouver and England to register their votes".<sup>13</sup>

The customary practice of non-labour men running as independents ended in 1919. From that election onward almost all candidates would seek endorsement by either Labour (or the N.D.P. presently) or the League (now called the Greater Winnipeg Election Committee). The Citizens' League was determined, in 1919, that the non-Labour vote should be unified behind its own candidates. Its ward committees made the necessary adjustments. In Ward One, the incumbent alderman, Isaac Cockburn, stepped down in favour of a stronger candidate, J. G. Sullivan, because, as Cockburn put it, "I will not be a party to the domination of the Reds. We must not split this vote".<sup>14</sup> In Ward Four, a partially working class district in central Winnipeg

which would be real fighting ground, Alderman MacLean retired to allow former mayor, F. H. Davidson, to contest the election for the League. MacLean explained that

. . . the safety of the ward — and the safety of the city was at stake, and that to a large extent the people of Winnipeg will decide on November 28th what is going to be done in the Dominion of Canada.<sup>15</sup>

In all seven wards, the election was a straight two-way fight between the League and Labour.

The inflamed emotions generated by the Strike, while crucially important, do not completely account for the virulence of the 1919 campaign. Labour, unlike the Citizens' League, did not have the option of re-fighting the Strike. From the beginning of the campaign it was on the defensive. An election platform was produced which from Labour's point of view was reasonable and moderate. But in fact it helped to solidify the class lines being drawn through the city by the struggle. Among other things, Labour sought the reinstatement of civic employees dismissed during the Strike and the right of public employees to organize and affiliate with the T.L.C. Other objectives were free text books, public ownership of utilities, a municipal dairy and a progressive property tax policy exempting all homes assessed at under \$3,000. It need hardly be said that the League opposed the lot. Nor did it feel constrained to advance a programme of its own. Its objective was to break the power of Labour and control the City Council.

The tactics of the League were to associate all the Labour candidates with the O.B.U. and the leadership of the General Strike. Both Winnipeg dailies, the *Free Press* and the *Tribune* carried full page advertisements by the Citizens' League from November 16 until the election. Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, the financial records of the League do not account for their cost.<sup>16</sup> One example will indicate the tone of the advertisements. It began, "There is only one issue . . . Red or White. No one class shall threaten dictate or demand". The citizens of Winnipeg were called upon to be true to the Union Jack and not to replace it with the 'Red' flag.<sup>17</sup> League candidates reflected this line of attack. Mayor Gray, at an election rally, proclaimed

. . . there was only one issue in this election, whether the city is to be governed by the British traditions of law, order and equity or by one class who were fanatics.<sup>18</sup>

Labour, in reply, could only protest its loyalty. Patriotism is often the refuge for all kinds of people.

Editorially, the major dailies gave vigorous support to the League. J. W. Dafoe of the *Free Press* entitled one editorial "Bolshie Pulls the Strings"; and in another crystallized the election into "The fight between constitutionalism and revolution".<sup>19</sup> Behind the hyperbole, however, was a deep fear of the One Big Union. More and more the League and its supporters concentrated their fire on the connection between Labour candidates and the O.B.U.S.J. Farmer, the Labour mayoralty candidate, was extremely defensive on this issue and could not effectively counter the charge. The class orientation of the campaign was summed up neatly by Fred Tipping, the Labour aldermanic candidate in Ward Two when he claimed that

All representation up to date has been class representation . . . but not working class representation. Labour would put human rights over property rights.<sup>20</sup>

The election was a close run thing. Mayor Gray defeated Farmer 15,630 votes to 12,514 in the city-wide poll. The contest for the Council seats clearly revealed the geographic-class division of the city. The Citizens' League candidates were successful in Wards One through Four; and Labour won Wards Five, Six and Seven in the working-class north end. In the more affluent areas of the city — Wards One, Two and Three — the League won by substantial majorities. Labour, however, secured relatively narrow victories where it was successful. The League candidate in Ward Four — a mixed income area — received a small majority. There are two critical factors in analysing the results. It should be borne in mind that the property qualification eliminated many working-class immigrants. Secondly, the non-resident vote, based on property ownership, was actively recruited by the League. The *Winnipeg Tribune* estimated this vote at 10,000.<sup>21</sup> The vote-getting ability of the Citizens' League, in other words, depended to a large extent on the nature of the electoral system.

Labour was disappointed in the results of the 1919 campaign. They felt that their political power could never be marshalled effectively unless the property qualification was eliminated, proportional representation adopted and the Ward system abolished.<sup>22</sup> For its part, the Citizens' League considered that Labour had done all too well politically. The outcome of the 1919 election combined with the seven carryovers, left Winnipeg with a City Council of fourteen divided evenly between Labour and the League. Mayor Gray held the deciding vote. Frank Fowler, the alderman for Ward Two, wrote to Arthur Meighen, to

Thank you for your congratulations, and [*sic*] I am not sure that our victory is really as good as it looks on paper. While the election of the Mayor, is what the public generally outside of the City of Winnipeg, view and consider the sum and substance of the result of the elections, and viewed from that standpoint the election was certainly satisfactory, yet when you come to analyse and admit the fact that we lost two of the Wards to the "Reds", making the Council seven Citizens' Committee and seven Radical Labour, we are sailing pretty close to the wind.<sup>23</sup>

Fowler went on to complain that Wards in the south end of the city had far more voters than those in the north end, without, of course, mentioning the property qualifications. But his real concern, and that of his League colleagues, was ". . . that the O.B.U. is making very strong headway against the international element of labour in the City, and from present appearances absolutely control and dominate [*sic*] all labour in the City. This situation is not very consoling, as the O.B.U. is headed by a number of bitter Scotch and English socialists, whose meat, drink, pleasure and work is in promoting the One Big Union and ultra radical programs".<sup>24</sup>

The League, in view of this threat, could not be content with its narrow escape of 1919. In December of that year it was reorganized and placed on a more permanent basis. A levy on the business community was undertaken to provide financial support which included assessments on the Manitoba Law and Medical Societies, the Banker's Association, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the grain companies and many others.<sup>25</sup> The League's major effort was then directed toward restructuring the electoral system even more to its own advantage.

Throughout the late winter and early spring of 1920, the argument over "electoral reform" raged in the newspapers, City Council and finally in the Manitoba Legislature. The result was a very neat gerrymander through two amendments to the Winnipeg City Charter. They were guided through the Law Amendment's Committee of the provincial legislature by Robert Jacobs, who was an officer of the Citizens' League as well as being an M.L.A.<sup>26</sup> The effect of the amendments can be summarized quickly. The old fourteen-member council based on seven Wards was to be replaced by an eighteen-member council based on three Wards. The new boundaries make the intent obvious. The old Wards, Five, Six and Seven, where Labour's strength was concentrated, were hived off into the new Ward Three. A measure of proportional representation was adopted in the single



transferable ballot, but plural voting, based on property ownership was maintained. Property qualifications were also retained for election and for all votes on money by-laws. In the new Ward Three, the non-resident property vote amounted to ten per cent of the total electorate.<sup>27</sup>

The Citizens' League could look forward to a much more favourable outcome in the 1920 elections held under the newly revised charter. This growing complacency was reflected in a letter from J. W. Dafoe to Sir Clifford Sifton: "A victory for Labor a year ago in this town would have had very detrimental consequences and I think we did the right thing in doing our bit to defeat Labor. This year the situation is not quite so bad. Labor is entitled to a percentage of representation and will get it automatically."<sup>28</sup> Of almost equal importance in reducing Labour's political effectiveness, however, was the fragmentation that took place within the ranks of Labour between the end of the Strike and the autumn of 1920.

It is almost impossible to gauge the psychological effect of the Strike and its collapse on the Labour movement with any real accuracy. Labour was still defiant in the summer of 1919 and presented a united front in the subsequent civic election. But there may have been considerable pressure toward moderation. What is clear from the files of the *Western Labor News* is that the more conservative members of the International Unions launched a determined bid to wrest control of the Trades and Labour Council away from the O.B.U. Both D. C. Masters and Kenneth McNaught, the biographer of Woodsworth, agree that by late 1920 the power of the O.B.U. in Winnipeg was broken.<sup>29</sup> The most radical of Labour sympathizers went off with Jacob Penner to join the Communist Party of Canada. Others became Social Democrats. The Dominion Labour Party foundered and the Independent Labour Party re-emerged. Some, like R. B. Russell, remained with the O.B.U. In any case, what may have been a superficial Labour unity in 1919 had dissipated a year later. All manner of candidates calling themselves Labour men ran in the civic election of 1920.

The strident ideological overtones of the 1919 election did not reappear the following year. The election tended to concentrate on hard issues such as public housing and urban transportation. Yet it is evident that the class polarization of Winnipeg was beginning to set. It can be remarked, in general, that Labour (whatever its variety of appellation) sought an extension of social services and public responsibilities while the Citizens' League was reluctant to endorse anything that might

raise property and business taxes. The League maintained its electoral machinery but eschewed the loyalty issue and anti-Bolshevik rhetoric because it was confident of victory. It may also be worth considering that supporters of the League did not wish to resurrect the passions of the Strike, and not simply out of self-interest. Businessmen, as well as working people, are capable of a sincere regard for their community.

This dilemma is evident in a private letter of Dafoe to Sifton about the 1920 mayoralty election.

It is not a good thing for the *Free Press* to have, year after year, to take the position of fighting labor all along the line. It is not in keeping with our traditions, nor in harmony with our interest, yet we have had no alternative since Labor came under the control of its Red leaders.

The influence of moderate Labor is beginning to revive and moderates made an effort in the nominating convention to control the nomination for mayor. They put up Mr. Puttee but he was defeated by Mr. Farmer who was the Red candidate last year. If Mr. Puttee had been chosen, the *Free Press* would certainly have been neutral in the contest and I even think it possible that we would have supported him, a course which, if we could have taken it, would have done us much good. I know Farmer well. I really think he is a highly dangerous man. He is being opposed by Mr. Edward Parnell.

I have my doubts as to whether [Parnell] will prove a strong candidate. As the head of a big business concern and a man with presumably some money and also as President of the Board of Trade, he is just a natural mark, not only for Labor, but for thousands of other people who are discontented with present conditions. . . . I am inclined to think we shall have to oppose Mr. Farmer on his record even if we do not care to directly support Mr. Parnell.<sup>30</sup>

One is never able to assess the imponderables in an election. As an illustration, there was widespread sympathy for Labour as a result of the Strike trials which dragged on well into 1920. As Labour's grievances were more calmly considered, the bogey of Bolshevism was quietly scotched. While the Citizens' League was less vituperative in 1920, its members were every bit as determined. Its unity and hard-working ward committees were in sharp contrast to the disarray of Labour.

Their superior organization rewarded the League handsomely. Twelve of the new eighteen-member City Council had been endorsed by the Citizens' League. This result can readily be attributed to the gerrymandered Ward boundaries and Labour's disastrous lack of cohesion.<sup>31</sup> Yet in the city-wide election for mayor, Parnell defeated

S. J. Farmer by only 931 votes out of a total poll of almost 30,000.<sup>32</sup> Dafoe's premonition was not far off the mark.

The significant difference in tone of the 1919 and 1920 municipal elections — the absence of inflamed rhetoric with reference to red herrings of Bolshevism, aliens, bossism and Marxist invective — should not disguise the fact that Winnipeg by no means returned to the pre-Strike political situation. The politics of class had come to stay. This was quite evident both in the issues and the geographic-economic distribution of the 1920 vote. The Strike had a catalytic effect, fundamentally changing political attitudes in the city. If the confrontation was more polite it was no less a basic cleavage. A brief glance at the civic campaign of 1922 will indicate the permanent distraction that the Strike and its consequences injected into Winnipeg politics.

Unlike most elections, that of 1922 was fought over a single issue. The background is complex, but reveals starkly the political alignment that was now stamped upon the city.<sup>33</sup> The contest revolved around the plans of the Winnipeg Electric Street Railway Company. This organization had received a franchise in 1892 as a private monopoly supplying power, gas and street car service to the city. After 1911 it had to compete with the municipally owned City Hydro in the power field, but retained its monopoly in the other areas of its activities. The franchise contained a clause which gave to the city the option of buying out the company at five-year intervals.

By 1922, the Street Railway was planning a major power development on the Winnipeg River. In order to attract the large amount of capital necessary for the undertaking and provide time to realize some return on investment the Company needed some assurance that the city would not exercise its option in the interval. A period of fifteen years was felt to be adequate. In other words the city would forego its right to take over the company in 1922, 1927 and 1932. This was not an unreasonable request considering the investment capital involved.

But Winnipeg did not enjoy a rational political climate. The Street Railway was aware that its public image was considerably tarnished. It had a history of labour trouble, including a rather bitter strike in 1906. During the General Strike it had been a particular target of Labour. Several attempts to increase street car fares, most recently in 1920, had aroused widespread hostility.

The Company hoped to negotiate directly with the City Council, and attempted to have Dafoe bring the *Free Press* out in favour of its

scheme. Instead, the *Free Press* supported a referendum on what it called a matter of policy. The reaction of the City Council was interesting. It refused to take the responsibility of extending the Company's franchise on its own initiative. A referendum was called but voting was to be restricted to property owners. In a letter to Sifton, Dafoe pointed out the contradictory pressures brought to bear.

There are 27,000 tenant electors in this city, most of them, I think, readers of the *Free Press*, and most of them I am very sure, of the opinion that this is a question upon which they have a right to be consulted. We campaigned strongly against the proposal that the vote should be narrowed; but the street railway line-up in the city council could not be broken; the matter had evidently been very carefully arranged.<sup>34</sup>

The referendum, however, could not be held before the municipal elections. Labour seized upon the issue and championed the cause of the tenant electors. The mayoralty vote became, in fact, an unofficial referendum. The Citizens' League tended to favour the position of the Street Railway Company. But the former unanimity with which the business community had supported the League was not quite as evident in 1922. The *Winnipeg Tribune* attacked the Street Railway's tactics and its scheme for franchise extension. Frank Fowler, who had been a founder of the Citizens' Committee of 1000 and subsequently a League alderman, was advocating public ownership of the transit system. He was the manager of the Grain Exchange clearing house. According to Dafoe, the League allies of the Street Railway had elevated Fowler to the mayor's office in June, 1922, upon the death of Mayor Parnell simply to get him out of the way. The League would not endorse him in the autumn election. Dafoe found the machinations of the League "exasperating to those more sensible elements of the community which have been trying to maintain moderate policies in the city business".<sup>35</sup>

The League nominated for mayor J. K. Sparling, lawyer, alderman for Ward One, and an active member of the City Council behind the Street Railway proposition. Labour again put up S. J. Farmer, the two-time loser. But this time Farmer had the issue. The involved question of power development was quickly over-simplified into good guys and bad guys — the wicked, private monopoly against the rights of the people. It was ironical that shortly after, the company received the extension of its franchise with virtually no public opposition. In the event however, Farmer won handily in 1922, and Winnipeg had its first Labour mayor. The Grain Exchange Building did not even quiver.

John Dafoe solved his personal dilemma in hard-headed fashion. As he put it, "The business organizations such as the active membership of the Board of Trade, the Manufacturers' Association and the Employers' Association are practically solid behind the street railway but when it comes to voting or buying newspapers they don't amount to very much".<sup>36</sup>

The psychological impact of the Winnipeg General Strike upon the city had now assumed its permanent political expression. Despite the defection of the newspapers, which had to acknowledge public opinion, and individual cases, the business community has worked through the Citizens' League or its later variants to oppose Labour at the municipal level. The clash has often appeared almost ritualistic. The first meeting of any newly-elected City Council reflects the basic polarization as the two groups caucus and contend for the important committee chairmanships such as finance. There is still much research to be done in elaborating the full ramifications of the Strike upon the life of Winnipeg, but clearly the issue of collective bargaining will be only a minor theme.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> D. C. Masters, *The Winnipeg General Strike*, (Toronto, 1950), p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> The Citizens' Committee has operated under a variety of names over the years. For some time now it has been called the Greater Winnipeg Election Committee.

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Masters, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>4</sup> See M. D. Savage, *Industrial Unionism in America*, (New York, 1922); and the *O.B.U. Bulletin* during 1919.

<sup>5</sup> David J. Bercuson, "The Winnipeg General Strike, Collective Bargaining, and the One Big Union Issue", *C.H.R.*, June, 1970, pp. 164-176.

<sup>6</sup> *Western Labour News*, 12 July, 1919.

<sup>7</sup> *Winnipeg Telegram*, 21 August, 1919.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 23 September, 1919.

<sup>9</sup> The following information was drawn from *Henderson's Winnipeg City Directory*, 1919.

a) Occupation	Number
Doctors, Dentists, Lawyers	10
Insurance, real estate, grain, finance	16
Retails and wholesale merchants	10
Manufacturers and contractors	6
*Other professional	5
Publishers and printers	2
**Miscellaneous	2
Unknown	5
	<hr/> 56

\*Two engineers, one architect, one civil servant, one hotel manager

\*\*One salesman, one railway foreman

b) <i>Place of Residence</i>	<i>Number</i>
South of Portage Avenue	42
North of Portage Avenue	9
Unknown	5
	<hr/> 56

- 10 *Winnipeg Telegram*, 23 September, 1919.
- 11 *Winnipeg Tribune*, 11 November, 13 November, 1919.
- 12 *Western Labor News*, October 10, 17, 24, November 7, 1919.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 26 November, 1920.
- 14 *Manitoba Free Press*, 12 November, 1919.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 Public Archives of Manitoba, *Citizens' Committee*, Finance Committee Minutes, 1919-1920.
- 17 *Manitoba Free Press*, *Winnipeg Tribune*, 19 November, 1919.
- 18 *Manitoba Free Press*, 6 November, 1919.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 6 November, 1919, 19 November, 1919.
- 20 *Western Labor News*, 31 October, 1919.
- 21 *Winnipeg Tribune*, 21 November, 1919.
- 22 *Manitoba Free Press*, 20 February, 17 March 1920.
- 23 P.A.C., *Meighen Papers*, vol. 5, Fowler to Meighen, 3 December, 1919.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 P.A.M., R.A.C. *Manning Papers*, file 3.
- 26 *Winnipeg Telegram*, 21 August, 1919.
- 27 *Manitoba Free Press*, 23 November, 1920.
- 28 University of Manitoba, *Dafoe Correspondence*, Dafoe to Sifton, 10 November, 1920.
- 29 Masters, *op. cit.*, p. 140; K. McKnight, *A Prophet in Politics*, (Toronto, 1959), p. 147.
- 30 P.A.C., *Sifton Papers*, vol. 207, pp. 162563 — 34 and 35.
- 31 *Western Labor News*, 10 December, 1919.
- 32 See *Manitoba Free Press*, 4 December, 1920, for complete results.
- 33 The account which follows is drawn from the Winnipeg newspapers of the autumn of 1922; but more importantly from a long private letter from Dafoe to Sifton, P.A.C., *Sifton Papers*, vol. 209, pp. 163251 — 96 to 100.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 *Ibid.*